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aLaboratoire d’Economie de la Production et de l’Intégration Internationale, LEPII, CNRS-Université de 
Grenoble, France. 
Abstract 
Purpose - The study aims to quantify the possible interactions between the three European objectives 
in the horizon of 2020: (i) the reduction of 20% of greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) (2) the saving of 
20% of the European energy consumption and (3) a share of 20% of renewable energies in the overall 
energy consumption. Particular focus is, however, placed on the influence of the CO2 emission 
reduction targets and on their consequences on the carbon price in 2020.  
Design/methodology/approach - In order to explore the interactions among the three European 
objectives and their induced effects, a number of scenarios are tested within a combination of two 
modeling tools: the POLES world energy model and ASPEN, an auxiliary model dedicated to the 
analysis of quota trading systems. With reasonable assumptions for the burden sharing among the 
Member States, the energy efficiency objectives and the renewable energy targets are achieved using 
national quota systems in each European country (white and green certificate systems and their 
implicit prices), while the CO2 emission reduction is carried out within the European Emissions Trading 
Scheme (ETS) in line with the objective of 20% emission reduction. 
Findings - The paper shows, in particular, that the two quota policies (WC and GC) decrease 
significantly the European marginal emission reduction cost and consequently, the compliance costs 
for ETS participants. The high renewable target compliance cost could be reduced significantly if 
carbon price signal and energy saving policies are in place. The paper also shows that the sole carbon 
price signal has a limited influence for stimulating renewable energies and energy savings and thus 
concludes on the need for specific policies targeting these two areas. 
Keywords - CO2 emissions, carbon price, white certificate price, green certificate price, European 
objectives in 2020 
Paper type - Research paper 
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The European Council on the 8 and 9 march of 2007 decided to achieve three ambitious obligations 
for the 2020 horizon: (1) the reduction of 20% of greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) (and up to 30% if 
an international agreement justifies it) (2) the saving of 20% of the energy consumption and (3) the 
share of 20% of renewable energies in the overall energy consumption. The key element of these 
ambitions, in relation to the fight against the climate change, is the reduction of GHG emissions 
(Criqui, 2007). The European emissions trading scheme (EU ETS, thereafter referred to as ETS) 
includes the energy intensive European industries and the electricity producers. It represents at least 
45-50% of CO2 emissions in Europe and will remain, according to the European institutions, the key 
instrument in reaching Kyoto and post-Kyoto targets. By January 2008, the Commission has 
introduced the first proposals for national targets in the “20/20/20” policy, and negotiations are going 
on. This paper is a first attempt to comprehensively deal with the economic fundamentals of the three-
dimensional regulatory system proposed by the Commission for energy and climate.  
For renewable energies, the Commission didn’t specify the particular instruments for increasing the 
share of renewable energies to 20% in total energy consumption. However in recent years, the feed-in 
tariffs proved to be effective in increasing the development of renewable energies. Quota systems 
coupled with the exchange of “green certificates” (GC), which prove the origin of the production, also 
became an increasingly common instrument to facilitate the diffusion of renewable electricity (Bertoldi 
and Rezessy, 2006). Market instruments are equally high on the agenda for stimulating energy 
efficiency and savings. An instrument, frequently identified in the academic and political debate, is the 
one of energy saving obligations coupled with the exchange of certificates representing the savings 
achieved and often denominated as “white certificates” (WC).  
Increased energy efficiency while diminishing the whole set of externalities associated with energy 
production will consequently decrease the cost of GHG emission reductions
1. Likewise increased 
utilization of renewable energies, which are justified for considerations of security of supply, 
employment or regional or local benefits could participate in the reduction of GHG emissions. Strong 
interactions exist, therefore, in terms of emission reductions, but also in terms of costs of programmes 
chosen to reach their respective objectives. Several studies have analyzed the possible interactions 
on theoretical grounds (NERA, 2005, Bertoldi and Rezessy, 2006, Doucet and Percebois, 2007). 
Additionally, the authors analyze the integration possibilities of different quota systems in Europe: 
ETS, GC and WC. For the short term, they conclude in favor of separate quota systems for fear of 
double counting possibilities for one action undertaken as well as of the related complexities of 
integration, which, eventually, might dampen its benefits.  
                                                                                                                                                                       
 
1 It should be noted that energy efficiency does not always produce energy savings for possible “rebound effects” 
(Herring, 2006). Energy savings might likewise result from the behavioral changes leading to conservation of 
energy. In our study, we keep in line with Bertoldi and Rezessy who consider that only “additional energy savings 
justify a policy intervention: policy may support measures that involve either investments or achieved savings (or 









































8Our study does not analyze the integration of the three quota systems nor their specific design, but 
aims at quantifying the consequences of the objectives that Commission proposes for 2020. The 
evaluation of relative efficiency of market-based instruments such as taxes vs. tradable permits or 
certificates is outside the scope of the study. Therefore, we consider that the respective national 
objectives for energy savings and renewable energies are being realized with quota systems in every 
country: WC and GC systems, which represent the national implicit or shadow prices that would be 
required to attain the objectives. CO2 emissions reduction is carried out within ETS and is consistent 
with the EU's commitment of 20% emission reduction by 2020.   
In reality, the implementation of the three objectives will interact simultaneously. However, due to the 
intrinsic difficulties in the evaluation of superposed actions, we examine the impact of one objective on 
the implementation of another objective in a sequential manner. For that, we create a number of 
scenarios representing the introduction of the sole quota systems or a combination of quota systems 
introduced in a sequential manner. The priority for the introduction is, however, placed on energy 
savings that is WC systems since the reduction of energy consumption is often considered as a 
structural, low-cost reduction option (Bertoldi et al., 2005). The scenarios are tested with a 
combination of two modeling tools: the POLES world energy model and ASPEN, which is dedicated 
for the analysis of quota systems
2. A static and competitive equilibrium environment is assumed for 
the study. 
The paper proposes a comprehensive approach of the economics of the “20/20/20” European policy. It 
develops along the following: in section 1, we introduce the principal policies for reducing GHG 
emissions as well as increasing energy savings and renewable energies in EU; in section 2 we first 
explore the interactions among ETS, GC and WC systems in a theoretical perspective and then 
display the methodology for quantifying these interactions; section 3 later delivers and analyses the 
main results of this study; lastly, we present our main conclusions in section 4. The paper shows, in 
particular, that the energy saving and renewable quota policies (WC and GC) significantly decrease 
the European marginal CO2 emission reduction cost and consequently, the compliance costs for ETS 
participants. It also shows that the sole carbon price signal has a limited influence for stimulating 
renewable energies and energy savings, thus, affirming once again the need for specific policies 
targeting these two areas
3.  
                                                       
2 For a short description of the POLES world energy model refer to Annex 1, for a more detailed description refer 
to Lepii-Epe, 2006. For the functioning principle of ASPEN refer to Criqui et al., 1999, Lepii-Epe, 2001, 
Stankeviciute et al., 2007. Unfortunately, the ASPEN described does not include yet WC and GC systems.  









































81 THE CONTEXT OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES IN EUROPE: 
CLIMATE POLICIES, ENERGY SAVINGS AND RENEWABLE 
ENERGIES 
EU is generally acknowledged for playing a strategic role in climate negotiations. The policies adopted 
at the European level are important not only for the emission reductions in the Member countries, but 
also for the development of the international climate regime. The lessons learnt in formulating the 
coordinated climate change policy at the European level, in particular the failure of the introduction of 
the carbon-energy tax in the early nineties, have lead to a reflection on alternative policies, also 
efficient and appropriate to market conditions (Andersen, 2005). In establishing the ETS Directive and 
in proposing the quantitative objectives in the field of energy savings and renewable energies in 2020, 
the EU shows a marked preference for “cap & trade” or “baseline & credit” systems, where the 
quantitative objectives are known, but not the marginal costs of the actions to be undertaken, whereas 
with taxes, the accepted cost – at least the marginal cost – is known initially, but not the quantities to 
be eventually achieved (Weitzman, 1974). In theory, the market-based instruments minimize the cost 
for the society when reaching a certain objective (static efficiency) and also provide the incentives for 
adoption and innovation of new clean technologies (dynamic efficiency) (Jaffe et al., 2003).   
1.1  The European emission trading system (ETS) in its regulatory context 
The ETS is aims at providing an efficient way to be offered to the Member countries to ensure a 
significant part of their Kyoto obligations and to progress towards a low carbon economy in the future. 
The system relies on the creation of a price for carbon emissions by establishing the market for 
emission allowances or quotas. From the economic point of view, the market solution allows 
minimizing the total costs of a particular programme since the exchange of quotas equalizes the 
marginal costs of reductions, while mobilizing only the least-cost options (Criqui, 2002). 
The ETS is supposed by the EU to achieve its Kyoto target at a cost of € 2.9 to € 3.7 billion annually 
(European Commission, 2004). This is less than 0.1% of the EU's GDP. Without the scheme, 
compliance costs are evaluated at € 6.8 billion a year. The system was initially founded on six main 
principles
4: (1) it is a “cap & trade” system, (2) its initial focus is on CO2 emissions from large industrial 
emitters, (3) implementation takes place in two phases (2005-07 and 2008-12) with periodic reviews 
and opportunities for expansion to other gases and  sectors,  (4)  the allocation plans (NAPs) are 
decided periodically by the Member countries in line with Kyoto objectives, but require the approval of 
the Commission, (5) it includes a strong compliance framework (the penalty for exceeding the quotas 
is fixed for the two phases € 40 and € 100/tCO2 respectively), (6) ETS taps emission reduction 
opportunities in the rest of the world through the use of Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and 
                                                       









































8Joint Implementation (JI) projects, and provides for links with compatible schemes in other Annex B 
countries (refer to Directive 2004/101/CE). 
In operation, the ETS has shown itself so far to be an administrative success, with the overwhelming 
majority of installations reporting their independently verified CO2 emissions and surrendering the 
appropriate number of allowances to cover them at the required deadlines (Environmental Audit 
Committee, 2007). However, the emission reductions turn out to be less impressive. The verified 
emissions in 2005 showed that the CO2 market was long of allowances and not short as it was 
anticipated in the beginning of the programme. The surplus of allowances was due to a combination of 
two factors: (1) generous national allocations and (2) effective internal reductions. The market analysts 
consider that the first factor was by far the most important (Point Carbon, 2007), but some economic 
studies show that both factors have occurred, the second one even greater than the first one 
(Ellerman and Buchner, 2006). In either case, the European authorities have retained the lessons from 
the first experimental phase; the Commission review process of the second round of NAPs for the 
2008-2012 period turns out to be more vigorous, involving reductions of initial national quotas for 
almost every Member country. The definite success of the ETS will be principally judged on two 
elements: the emission reductions obtained and the appearance of stable carbon price. 
1.2  The European policies for energy savings 
The Directive on energy end-use efficiency and energy services, which came into effect in April 2006, 
aims at fostering cost effective improvements of energy end use and at transforming and promoting 
the market for energy services (2006/32/EC). The Directive establishes an indicative energy savings 
target of an additional 1% annually in the nine years following the adoption of the Directive. The base 
year for the energy savings is calculated using the average energy consumption during the last five 
years before the entry into force of the Directive. It applies to all sectors of final energy consumption, 
except aviation and the industries under the ETS. To achieve this objective, Member States must 
prepare three national energy efficiency action plans and ensure that the public sector fulfils an 
exemplary role regarding investments, maintenance and other expenditure on energy-using 
equipment as well as energy services. Additionally, the implementation of the Directive on the energy 
performance of buildings (2002/91/EC), as from 2006, will permit a gain estimated at some 40 Mtoe 
between now and 2020 (European Commission, 2005a). To the extent that energy consumption has a 
significant impact on the environment, which is often the case for household appliances, the 
Commission aims at establishing energy-efficiency requirements for a large range of appliances and 
applications
5 (Directive, 2005/32/EC). Furthermore, the Union has implemented until now voluntary 
agreements with the car industry and labeling of cars on energy efficiency in order to limit the fuel 
consumption of vehicles (European Commission, 2005a). 
                                                       









































8According to the Green Paper, EU could save 20% of its energy consumption in 2020 (European 
Commission, 2005a). Experience shows that the diffused potentials for energy savings in the 
residential, service or transport sectors are not sufficiently exploited through the classical instruments 
used in numerous European countries – information of consumers, regulation, fiscal subsidies and 
incitations – because the feasible energy savings are not sufficiently valued by the decision-makers 
(Moisan, 2004). Furthermore, with the gradual opening of electricity and gas markets to competition, 
the instruments for promoting efficient use of energy should be compatible with the market conditions. 
Market instruments are relevant for completing the cost-effective exploitation of energy savings 
potential and are compatible with the new market conditions.  
The combination of an energy saving obligation for some category of operators (distributors, suppliers, 
consumers, etc.) coupled with tradable certificates (WC) representing the energy saved has already 
attracted the attention of some European countries. Similar systems exist in Italy, France, United 
Kingdom and Flanders, Belgium. The discussions are in process for the establishment of such a 
system in Netherlands
6. However, in their analysis Bertoldi and Rezessy show that the existing 
systems remain quite different one from another, with respect to the actors placed under regulation, to 
the eligible measures and sectors, and to the resulting performances (Bertoldi and Rezessy, 2006).  
1.3  The European policies for renewable energies 
Increasing the share of renewable energy sources in the final energy consumption and, in particular, in 
the electricity generation is also one of the Community’s targets for 2010 as stated in the Directive of 
electricity production from renewable energy sources (2001/77/EC). The principal support schemes, 
adopted by Member states, comprise price-based feed-in tariffs (FIT), quantity-based quota systems 
or Green Certificates and, to a lesser extent, the calls for tenders and financial incentives.  
The FITs allow the producers to sell the green electricity at a fixed price per kWh. This price or tariff is 
usually above the market price and is guaranteed for a number of years. The quota system or the GC 
system consists of: i. the establishment of quotas for the production of green electricity imposed on the 
operators intervening on the electricity market, i.e. distributors, retailers or producers-importers; ii. the 
flexibility associated with the trading of certificates among the operators under regulation. These can 
produce the desired quantity of green electricity, negotiate long term contracts with specialized 
renewable producers, or purchase certificates corresponding to a certain production of green 
electricity (Menanteau et al., 2002).  
In general, the GC systems were favored by the Commission because they satisfy the cost-
effectiveness rationale as well as unified market conditions comparing to FITs (Lauber, 2002). 
However, in a report of December 2005, the European Commission noticed that FIT regulations were 
very effective for promoting renewable electricity (European Commission, 2005b). They have proven 
their effectiveness by enabling the marked growth of the installed production capacities. The important 
                                                       









































8increases in the green electricity production have occurred in Germany and Spain, those countries 
with FIT policy. The quota systems with tradable certificates that were implemented in some countries 
have not shown comparable results
7. Additionally, the costs proved to be higher in countries with 
quota systems than in countries with FIT regulation, which also reflects higher risks for operators of 
facilities (European Commission, 2005b). Therefore, even if these systems present theoretical 
advantages, they remain complex to implement and operate well only if the necessary market 
infrastructure is very carefully developed. Several authors also indicate that GC systems introduced at 
the European level would probably be more efficient than those introduced at the national levels since 
a deeper market would produce more stable GC price and diminish the problems related to the fixing 
of adequate quotas (del Rio, 2005). 
On the other hand, some argue that FIT regulation, because they generate rents, might be inefficient 
in terms of allocative resource efficiency and offer only little incentives for the reduction of the 
production costs, despite their undeniable effectiveness in the push of green electricity production 
(Menanteau et al., 2002). While both systems are said to have advantages and drawbacks, the 
discussion on which support system is best is not approached in this article
8. The theoretic 
interactions among the three instruments: ETS, WC and GC are highlighted in the next section. 
2 INTERACTIONS OF THE THREE REGULATORY SYSTEMS 
Theoretical interactions have been analyzed in NERA (2005). Here, we recapture the aspects relevant 
to our empirical analysis, and then develop a methodology for the taking into account of these 
interactions. 
2.1  Regulatory interactions in theory 
The impacts of WC and GC systems on the overall CO2 emissions and on the emissions in the ETS 
The WC system alone can help to diminish the CO2 emissions when the installations are not initially 
included in the ETS. The reduction of direct consumption of fuels in households and buildings fits well 
with a policy of emission reductions driven by a WC system. However, the limitation of network 
electricity consumption in households does not generate additional reductions because electricity is 
already included in the ETS. In theory, the WC system does not influence the reduction of emissions 
originating from ETS because the quota in ETS is defined ex-ante. Counting of the avoided emissions 
due to the WC system would result in double counting of CO2 quantity since electricity saved also 
                                                       
7 Latvia (combined with FITs), Belgium, Italy, Poland, Sweden and United Kingdom. 
8 For a discussion of FIT vs tradeable green certificates refer to: Butler and Neuhoff, 2005, Midttun and Gautesen, 









































8reduces the emissions in the electricity sector under ETS. The displaced fossil fuel generation would 
free up ETS allowances that would be used to cover emissions elsewhere. 
As to GC system for renewable energies, it would reduce CO2 emissions only if the green electricity 
replaces polluting fossil-fuelled electricity generation. Indeed, the ETS already encourages indirectly 
low-carbon investment and punishes emitting technologies. However, ETS would spur the investments 
in renewable energy technologies only after all the low cost options have been exhausted on the 
market. Furthermore, the double counting problems would again appear if the emission reduction 
benefits were counted by the GC system (Sorell, 2003).  
The impacts of WC and GC systems on the costs of the overall and ETS CO2 emissions reduction. 
The introduction of the WC and GC systems might lead to the reduction of the demand for allowances 
in ETS and, consequently, of the CO2 price on the market. The preceding takes place when the WC 
and GC systems “pay” for certain emission reductions via  the decrease in polluting production. 
Consequently, the allowance price and the compliance costs for the participants in the ETS are 
reduced. However, this decrease in costs does not mean that the overall costs of reducing emissions 
and achieving the cap is lower with certificate systems than without. The overall costs might even be 
higher, as the measures undertaken under WC and GC systems might be more expensive than those 
undertaken under the cost-minimizing optimum of ETS alone
9. This situation is, however, less likely to 
occur for WC system since the majority of the reduction options are considered to be low-cost 
(Commission Europeans, 2005).  
The impacts of WC and GC systems on the electricity market in the ETS 
The WC and GC systems may decrease the price of electricity if the energy savings achieved or the 
renewable technologies replace fossil fuel-based electricity generation. The reduced demand for 
electricity may then lead to a lower marginal production cost (or to a decrease in polluting production, 
which usually fixes the market price) and therefore to a lower price
10. This decrease could be, 
however, compensated by the pass-through of costs related to energy-saving or renewable 
technologies. Typically, the increase in electricity price should be more important when the three 
systems are in force together rather than within each one. In the long term, the impacts on the 
electricity producing mix and its price are less clear since they depend from the investments in new 
generation capacities, which in return, depend partially from the expected costs related to 
environmental regulations. The following section introduces the methodology used for quantifying 
different interactions among the three objectives in Europe. 
                                                       
9 “If the measures incentivised by WC and GC systems were the most cost-effective available, then these 
measures would anyway be incentivised by ETS, without the need for additional programmes” (NERA, 2005). 









































82.2  A practical methodology for the simulation of regulatory interactions 
In order to analyze the economic fundamentals of the triple system of regulation schemes in the 
“20/20/20” policy, it is first necessary to precisely derive national and European objectives in the field 
of energy savings, renewable energies and ETS so as the respective national and European prices to 
attain these objectives. Secondly, we define the scenarios that are relevant for the analysis of 
interactions among the three objectives.  
National objectives for energy savings are defined with respect to the European objective announced 
by the Council: saving of 20% of the EU's energy consumption compared to projections for 2020 
(Council of EU, 2007). However, the share of the efforts needed by each Member country to achieve 
the European objective was not specified by the Council. In this study, we use the Reference scenario 
of the POLES model for the projections of primary energy consumption, which in a case without any 
environmental policies, corresponds to total emissions of 1995 Mtoe in EU25 in 2020
11. In order to 
comply with the Council’s objectives, primary energy consumption in the European community should 
be around 1590 Mtoe in 2020, which represents a cumulative reduction of consumption of 10.8% from 
the base year 2005 or an average reduction of 0.67% p.a. from 2005. We observed in the section   1.2 
that the existing WC systems throughout Europe are not harmonized and differ in terms of actors 
involved, eligible measures and sectors. We assume that the national WC systems cover residential, 
commercial, industrial and transport sectors. Hence, we produce continuous marginal primary energy 
consumption curves for every country using successive simulations of the POLES model, with 
progressively increasing energy consumption taxes in the sectors mentioned. Furthermore, the curves 
are introduced in the ASPEN sub-model, which allows deriving the implicit national WC prices as a 
function of national objectives.  
National objectives for renewable energies in our study are defined with respect to the indicative 
European target of one third in the electricity consumption in 2020 as it was indicated by International 
Energy Agency (IEA, 2007). With this assumption we do not fully stick to the European objective of 
20% share of renewable energies in overall energy consumption in Europe in 2020 (Council of EU, 
2007)
12. However, it seemed of interest to us, to focus on the contribution of green electricity to the 
renewable objective in final energy consumption. As we will see later in section 3 of the study, the 
implementation of the indicative green electricity objective approaches the European renewable 
objective in the final energy consumption. Contrary to the objective of energy savings, the Council 
indicates that national objectives for renewable energies should be defined as a function of potentials 
and efforts already put in place: 
                                                       
11 The reference projections of the PRIMES model, on which the Commission bases its energy efficiency 
objective, amounts to 1990 Mtep in 2020 (European Commission, 2005a).  
12 Besides green electricity, renewable objective comprises heat from renewable sources as well as utilisation of 
10% biofuels. Only green electricity is incentivised in our study, but all renewable energy sources are added up 









































8“differentiated national overall targets … with due regard to a fair and adequate allocation taking account 
of different national starting points and potentials, including the existing level of renewable energies and 
energy mix” 
and “leaving it to Member States to decide on national targets for each specific sector of renewable 
energies (electricity, heating and cooling, biofuels)” 
Taking these indications into account, in our study we employ the indicative national targets for 2010 
under the Directive of electricity production from renewable energy sources, which are compatible with 
the objective of 12 % share of renewable energies in the final energy consumption and, in particular, 
with a 21% share in the electricity consumption; then, we adjust the indicative targets so that they 
approach the share of one third of the electricity consumption in 2020. Once the national objectives 
have been defined, the continuous marginal renewable electricity production curves are produced by a 
series of successive simulations with increasing FITs in the POLES model, which allows later the 
calculation of the implicit national GC prices from ASPEN module. 
National objectives for emission reductions are defined with respect to European objective of 20% 
GHG emission reductions in 2020 comparing to 1990 for the EU25 (Council of EU, 2007). For 
modeling reasons, however, we cover in our study only CO2 emissions. The burden-sharing scheme 
used is based on the study performed by the German Institute for Economic Research (2007), 
presented in Annex 2. The sectoral distribution of the 2020 emissions quota comprises the information 
from the second NAPs under ETS for the ETS sectors and the latest GHG emissions inventories for 
the non ETS sectors. The sectoral proportions found are then inserted in the 2020 national emissions 
quotas. Using the POLES model, we then produce a series of successive simulations with an 
increasing carbon value in order to derive the continuous sectoral marginal abatement cost curves 
(MACC) for every country and region. Afterwards, the MACCs are inserted to ASPEN sub-module 
model for the analysis of the emissions trading system. In function of the national and sectoral 
emissions quotas and their participation in the carbon market, ASPEN calculates the equilibrium 
carbon price, project-based credit flows, reduction costs and equilibrium burden sharing among the 
countries. 
The carbon market in 2020 for its part beyond EU’s frontiers is modeled by including: i. the 
participation of the rest of annex B countries that ratified Kyoto protocol with CO2 emissions reduction 
constraints of 10% comparing to 2010 level, ii. the participation of the USA and Australia with 
constraints to stabilize their CO2 emissions in 2020 to 1990 level as it was proposed by the American 
senators McCain and Lieberman
13 (Pizer, et al., 2003) and iii. the participation of non-Annex  B 
countries through the emissions trajectories from the POLES reference scenario. For this latter 
category, no carbon constraints are imposed, but project-based mechanisms are allowed through 
CDM projects. However, only a restricted part of the theoretical potential is considered as potentially 
introducible to the market, due to high transaction costs that result from the lack of information or 
                                                       
13 According to the proposal of McCain-Lieberman, during the first six years of the program (2010-2016), annual 
GHG emissions would be limited to the amount released in 2000 and in subsequent years, the limit would be 









































8skilled personnel, political or economical obstacles, trade barriers or general politics of the developing 
country.  
In order to quantify the possible interactions among the environmental objectives we have created a 
number of scenarios displayed in Table 1. We notice that scenarios 2 to 5 are based on sole quota 
policies, while scenarios 6 to 9 consider the combination and different sequence introduction of such 
policies, although the priority is always placed on WC policy, which represents energy savings. 
Scenarios 6 to 9 are performed according to the following steps, e.g. for scenario 9: i. using the  
POLES model, the series of successive simulations are performed with a linearly increasing tax on 
final energy consumption, the results of which is treated in ASPEN to derive national WC prices; ii. a 
new set of successive simulations, including national WC prices is performed with a linearly increasing 
carbon value and analyzed in ASPEN module in order to obtain European CO2 ETS price; and finally 
iv. the last set of sensitivity analyses including both WC prices and CO2 ETS price is performed with a 
linearly increasing FIT and analyzed in ASPEN in order to derive national GC prices. The three set of 
prices are then combined to produce a final simulation of scenario 9 “WC+CO2 ETS+GC”.  
Table 1: Scenarios 
Scenarios Description
1. Reference No environmental policies
2. CO2 total Sensitivities of carbon value applied to all energy system sectors → European CO2 price (no international con
3. CO2 ETS Sensitivities of carbon value applied to ETS sectors → European CO2 ETS price (in international context)
4. GC Sensitivities of FIT applied to renewable electricity generation → national GC prices
5. WC Sensitivities of energy consumption tax → national WC prices
6. WC+GC National WC prices + ( Sensitivities → national GC prices )
7. WC+GC+CO2 ETS National WC prices + ( Sensitivities → national GC prices ) + ( Sensitivities → European CO2 ETS price )
8. WC+CO2 ETS National WC prices + ( Sensitivities → European CO2 ETS prices )
9. WC+CO2 ETS+GC National WC prices + ( Sensitivities → European CO2 ETS prices ) + ( Sensitivities → national GC prices )  
The distinction between scenarios CO2 total and CO2 ETS is the following: in the former, the objective 
of 20% reduction of CO2 emissions is applied to all energy system sectors (ETS and non ETS) 
comparing to 1990 emission level (or 12.7% reduction based on 2010); in the latter, the objective of 
CO2 emissions reduction for ETS sectors is calculated in line with the overall 20% objective and 
applied in ETS sectors (second NAPs are reduced by 11.7%)
14. Therefore, CO2 emissions in non ETS 
sectors are not addressed in this scenario, while in all following scenarios they are impacted either by 
WC or the combination of WC and GC quota policies, which indirectly contribute in reaching the 
overall 20% CO2 objective. The full development of these scenarios opens up a diversity of interesting 
results, which are exposed in the next section of the study.  
                                                       
14 Energy system sectors comprise ETS (energy industries, manufacturing and construction industries) and non -










































To start with the analysis of the numerous results, we first refer to the implicit national WC and GC 
prices as well as to the European or international CO2 prices. Afterwards, we look more closely at the 
effects of different scenarios on the CO2 market, renewable energies and energy savings, as well as 
on the changes in the European electricity production mix. 
3.1  Implicit prices of white and green certificates, price of CO2 
Energy savings by 20% comparing to the reference projections in 2020 result in relatively high national 
implicit WC prices shown in Table 2
15. There, it has to be emphasized that these prices correspond to 
the marginal cost of energy savings, i.e. the cost of the last and most expensive action to be engaged 
in order to meet the target. Thus the implicit price doesn’t reflect the average cost of energy savings, 
which – with convex energy saving supply curve of the type produced here – will be (far) inferior to half 
the marginal cost. We also notice that the WC prices are heterogeneous among countries, which 
would be a prerequisite condition for the establishment of a WC system at the European level. The 
introduction of WC trading among the countries would equalize the marginal costs of energy 
consumption reduction and result in a European WC price of 880 €/toe in 2020. The equilibrium 
burden sharing that would equalize the European WC price among the countries is also exposed in 
Table 2.  We recall however, that only national WC prices are taken into account in the rest of the 
study.  












UK 237 213 839 -10.9%
France  275 247 922 -9.5%
Italy 179 161 813 -11.2%
Germany 343 308 903 -9.8%
Spain 151 136 1211 -5.3%
Greece 32 29 1683 3.2%
Portugal 25 22 1285 -4.1%
Austria 35 31 754 -12.6%
Belgium, Lux 64 58 500 -16.8%
Denmark 22 20 1585 -2.7%
Finland 36 33 679 -13.8%
Ireland 16 14 1332 -1.6%
Netherlands 85 76 983 -8.7%
Sweden 51 46 193 -24.3%
Hungary 26 23 862 -10.6%
Poland 98 88 1062 -6.8%
Czech Rep. 43 39 795 -11.9%
Slovakia 16 15 739 -14.0%
Baltic countries 21 19 355 -22.3%
Sloven.-Malta-Cyprus 14 12 86 -24.6%
EU25 1769 1590 EU25 WC price = 880 €/toe  
                                                       
15 The early results from the Italian WC system lasting from 2005 to 2009 indicate the WC price of around 










































Producing one third of electricity with renewable energy sources in 2020 would imply the implicit 
national GC prices shown in Table 3. We recall that, as from Table 1,  there are three sets of GC 
prices, corresponding to different sequence introduction of renewable policy: (1) GC, (2) WC+GC 
(applying also to WC+GC+CO2 ETS), (3) WC+CO2 ETS+GC. Typically, the most important national 
and European GC prices are in the GC scenario since the accomplishment of the renewable objective 
is performed in an isolated way, without any other environmental policies. The introduction of the 
trading of GC among the European countries brings the European GC price down to 0.1 €/kWh
16. This 
price decreases to 0.07 €/kWh in the scenario WC+GC, due to the impact of national WC prices, 
which stimulate energy savings and thus allow to shrink the basis used for the renewable target. 
Finally, the implementation of energy saving objectives and CO2 emission reduction objective in ETS 
in the scenario WC+CO2 ETS+GC reduces even more the European GC price to 0.05 €/kW. We 
notice that the carbon price signal created in the ETS (in combination of WC prices) reduces the 
renewable compliance costs of EU25 by 43%  in the scenarios WC+CO2 ETS+GC compared to 
WC+GC.  



























UK 29% 0.090 4563 25% 0.068 1850 25% 0.052 994
France  28% 0.092 5243 27% 0.068 3213 24% 0.049 1941
Italy 35% 0.098 2237 34% 0.079 1414 35% 0.063 854
Germany 20% 0.095 3483 19% 0.075 1929 20% 0.058 1032
Spain 40% 0.090 3100 42% 0.076 1996 42% 0.058 1231
Greece 42% 0.109 1134 49% 0.071 752 52% 0.055 365
Portugal 73% 0.128 740 78% 0.083 507 78% 0.060 301
Austria 78% 0.181 528 82% 0.179 317 83% 0.128 204
Belgium, Lux 27% 0.117 627 26% 0.074 418 26% 0.057 251
Denmark 37% 0.050 198 37% 0.040 162 36% 0.025 44
Finland 66% 0.108 2150 66% 0.068 1495 60% 0.050 879
Ireland 62% 0.108 558 63% 0.063 464 63% 0.048 266
Netherlands 16% 0.089 721 12% 0.066 254 11% 0.052 131
Sweden 90% 0.131 1563 91% 0.134 2023 91% 0.047 1067
Hungary 14% 0.086 41 17% 0.052 26 19% 0.031 6
Poland 24% 0.076 610 27% 0.053 463 30% 0.038 123
Czech Rep. 14% 0.209 135 16% 0.158 85 18% 0.177 68
Slovakia 18% 0.259 29 22% 0.100 6 24% 0.064 2
Baltic countries 21% 0.095 142 21% 0.065 116 22% 0.048 73
Sloven.-Malta-Cyprus 51% 0.009 11 51% 0.009 12 54% 0.066 2
EU25, % and €/kWh 33% 0.095 27815 33% 0.071 17499 33% 0.0530 9834
WC + CO2 ETS + GC WC + GC GC
 
 
Turning to the analysis of the CO2 market, we now consider the price, emissions, project-based credits 
as well as the reduction costs (Table 4). Looking at the Table 1, we notice that we should have four 
sets of CO2 prices corresponding to scenarios: i. CO2 total, ii. CO2 ETS, iii. WC+GC+CO2 ETS and 
iv. WC+CO2 ETS (applying also to WC+CO2 ETS+GC). A distinction should be made between the 
first scenario CO2 total – where the CO2 market is confined to Europe that is all the reductions or 
purchases of allowances are produced within the EU25 – and all other scenarios, for which the 
                                                       
16 The cost of solar energy (the most expensive renewable energy today) is in the order of magnitude of 0.5 – 0.8 









































8  2.2 international carbon market is assumed, as in section  . Therefore, we observe in Table 4, that the 
reduction objective or shortfall is highest in the scenario CO2 total compared to all other scenarios 
and amounts to 1329 MtCO2. The absence of project-based credits makes the realization of European 
objective of 20% emission reduction very costly in terms of reduction costs and CO2 price, which in 
this case reaches 93 €/tCO2. The reduction objective as well as European marginal reduction cost is 
also high under the scenario CO2 ETS, since the carbon price only affects the ETS sectors. The 
import of project-based credits is, therefore, needed to alleviate the efforts of European industries. 
However one can notice that the domestic European reduction far exceeds the purchase of project-
based credits with 531 against 309 MtCO2. This is explained by the new flexibility margins created by 
a longer time-period (2020) for the change in investment patterns, which compensates for the 
increasing pressure created by stronger emission reduction targets. 
The required CO2 emissions reductions as well as the marginal reduction costs decrease significantly 
in the last two scenarios. This is due to the introduction of the other environmental policies aimed at 
achieving European objectives of energy savings and renewable energies. The combination of WC 
and GC systems in the scenario WC+GC+CO2 ETS reduces the CO2 emission shortfall by 73% 
compared to CO2 ETS and by 83% compared to CO2 total. The decrease is also important in the 
compliance costs for ETS participants. The combination of the three quota systems in the scenario 
WC+GC+CO2 ETS allow EU25 to reduce its emissions over its own target and sell the extra 
allowances on the international market. Nevertheless, the international carbon price is only slightly 
affected: it is of 31,2 €/tCO2 in the scenario WC+CO2 ETS and of 30,5 €/tCO2 in the scenario 
WC+GC+CO2 ETS, compared to 35,6 €/tCO2 in CO2 ETS. The addition of GC prices next to WC 
prices in the scenario WC+GC+CO2 ETS has a minor impact on the international carbon price.  
Table 4: CO2 market in 2020: prices, reduction costs, sales / purchases of credits (negative 




























CO2 total 1329 1329 92.5 0 75318 45304 92.5 -
CO2 ETS 840 531 63.2 309 35792 20124 - 35.6
WC+GC+CO2 ETS 220 248 27.2 -27 5921 3005 - 30.5
WC+CO2 ETS 361 335 33.8 26 12278 6141 - 31.2  
 
3.2  Impacts on the fundamentals of the energy sector 
The following analysis focuses on CO2 emissions, renewable energies utilization and energy savings 
achieved under all scenarios listed in Table 1. Therefore, Table 5 shows the results of final simulations 
that combine the prices from Tables 2 to 4, depending on different scenarios. From the environmental 
point of view, the Reference scenario would be a failure in all the three fields targeted by the 









































8increases the renewable energy utilization to 15% in the final energy consumption and it saves 12% of 
primary energy consumption in 2020. The price to pay is nevertheless high: a carbon value of 
93€/tCO2 should be indeed imposed to all energy sectors (see Table 4). Scenario CO2 ETS, 
represented only by the actual ETS and a quantity of project-based credits that facilitates ETS 
participants’ reduction efforts, diminishes the CO2 emissions in EU25 only by 3%.  The same scenario 
does even less for reducing energy consumption (only 5%) and increasing the use of renewable 
energies (14% in the final energy consumption). 
In the scenario GC, represented by a regulated green electricity supply in Member countries, the 
renewable energy utilization grows to 17% of final energy consumption. However, this scenario 
discourages energy savings and CO2 emission reductions. Besides the increases in energy savings, 
CO2 emissions might be reduced by 6% in the Community under scenario WC as a result of relatively 
high national implicit WC prices (see Table 2). Two quota policies, represented by scenario WC+GC, 
further decrease CO2 emissions to 13%. 
The contribution of the international carbon market in the scenario WC+GC+CO2 ETS allows fulfilling 
the Council’s expectations in all three targeted areas, but equally does the scenario WC+CO2 
ETS+GC. The magnitude of the compliance cost reduction with the renewable target impacted by CO2 
ETS price is larger (from 17499 M€ to 9834 M€ in Table 3) than the magnitude of the compliance cost 
reduction with ETS objective impacted by GC prices (from 6141 M€ to 3005 M€ in Table 4). Once WC 
policy has been implemented, for the same level of environmental performance WC+CO2 ETS+GC 
seems less costly to implement, with a total cost of 15976 M€ (for the joint CO2 ETS and Renewable 
targets) to be compared with 20503 M€ in scenario WC+GC+CO2 ETS.  










% in the final 
consumption
% in the 
electricity 
production
1. Reference 2559 1948 14% 12 17
2. CO2 total 1370 1816 -20% 15 30
3. CO2 ETS 1895 1945 -3% 14 21
4. GC 2261 1949 6% 17 30
5. WC 2061 1680 -6% 13 18
6. WC+GC 1765 1680 -13% 20 30
7. WC+GC+CO2 ETS 1468 1665 -21% 20 31
8. WC+CO2 ETS 1643 1667 -16% 15 22
9. WC+CO2 ETS+GC 1462 1667 -21% 20 32
CO2 emissions Renewable energies Energy savings
% comparing to the 












Finally, we examine in Table 6 the changes in the European electricity production mix that is implied 
by the different scenarios. Typically, the electricity production is at its lowest in the last three 
                                                       
17 We notice from the results of final simulations shown in Table 5 that due to the dynamics of the model and with 
national prices found for GC and WC scenarios via sensitivity analysis, we come close, but not enough to reach 
the respective council’s objectives: 17% for renewable energies and 16% for energy savings. Therefore, 
additional iteratives simulations were performed to attain the objectives, but the national GC and WC prices found 
were extremely high meaning that the achievement of the objectives should not be based on sole mechanism, but 









































8scenarios, where all – or almost all – environmental objectives are achieved. We notice, however, that 
despite of similar electricity production levels in these three scenarios, green electricity is lowest in 
WC+CO2 ETS, while fossil-fuel based generation is strongly reduced in WC+GC+CO2 ETS and 
WC+CO2 ETS+GC, since the introduction of GC prices still further encourages green electricity 
production. 
The scenarios that include all environmental policies (WC+GC+CO2 ETS and WC+CO2 ETS+GC) 
reduce the fossil-fuel based electricity generation by around 460 TWh in 2020, compared to scenario 
CO2 ETS. As a consequence, in the presence of other environmental policies, future CO2 allowance 
cap under ETS should probably be reduced for the electricity sector in order to account for the 
possible decrease of polluting electricity production. We notice also that the CO2 ETS carbon price 
signal alone does not stimulate sufficiently green electricity nor induce savings in the electricity 
production. This brings a strong rationale for introducing specific support policies and economic 
instruments for any further development of renewable energies and energy savings. 
Table 6: Impacts of the scenarios on the electricity production in 2020, TWh 
Reference CO2 total CO2 ETS GC WC WC+GC WC+GC+CO2 ETS WC+CO2 ETS WC+CO2 ETS+GC
 Thermal 2884 2335 2473 2547 2546 2234 2052 2287 2067
  of which:
     Coal 1318 602 946 1115 1128 928 721 863 732
     Gas 1303 1436 1232 1063 1191 965 979 1162 989
  Biomass and wastes 123 199 168 275 120 268 273 156 266
 Nuclear 869 904 905 808 802 754 792 851 800
 Hydro+Geoth 386 395 391 411 385 404 408 389 406
 S o l a r 1 2 2 1 2 2 222
 Wind 221 321 299 589 213 543 564 282 534
 Hydrogen 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
Total 4362 3957 4069 4357 3948 3938 3818 3810 3810  
4 CONCLUSION 
The methodology employed in the study allows for a comprehensive evaluation of the possible 
interactions among the different objectives for 2020: i. the reduction of 20% of greenhouse gas 
emissions (GHG), ii. the saving of 20% of the energy consumption and iii. a share of 20% of 
renewable energies in the total energy consumption. In line with the quantitative objectives fixed by 
the Commission, energy savings and renewable energy objectives in the study are feasible with the 
national quota systems – WC and GC systems – while the CO2 emission reductions are carried out 
through the ETS. We have calculated, therefore, the respective implicit national and European prices 
as a function of a set of consistent scenarios. Additionally, supposing the trading of certificates among 
the European countries, we expose the European WC and GC prices to attain the respective 
objectives. This may drive further research towards the analysis of the advantages of the creation of 
integrated WC and GC markets in Europe.  
The two scenarios WC+CO2 ETS+GC and WC+GC+CO2 ETS, which represent different sequences 
for introducing the CO2 ETS or GC constraint, show comparable results in terms of environmental 









































8price signal created in CO2 ETS (in combination with WC prices) has a stronger impact in terms of 
magnitude on the reduction of compliance cost with the renewable target than the GC prices have on 
the compliance costs of ETS participants. Nevertheless, the two quota systems (GC and WC) reduce 
significantly the European marginal emissions reduction cost and, consequently, the compliance costs 
for ETS participants. This is also confirmed by the changes in the electricity production mix, where the 
implementation of all environmental policies reduces significantly the use of fossil-fuel based electricity 
generation and, consequently, CO2 emissions.  Furthermore, the sole carbon price signal, in the 
scenarios CO2 ETS or CO2 total, is clearly insufficient for stimulating renewable energies and energy 
savings to the level required by EU policy, which confirms once again the need for specific policies 
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Annex 1: Poles model and reference scenario 
POLES is a partial equilibrium world simulation model for the energy sector (Criqui and Kouvaritakis, 









































8international energy prices and lagged adjustments of supply and demand by world region. The model 
enables to produce:  
-  Detailed long term (2100) world energy outlooks with demand, supply and price projections by 
main region; 
- CO2 emission Marginal Abatement Cost curves by region and/or sector, and emission trading 
systems analyses, under different market configurations and trading rules; 
-  Technology improvement scenarios – with exogenous or endogenous technological change – 
and analyses of the value of technological progress in the context of CO2 abatement policies (LEPII-
EPE, 2005). 
The reference scenario used to produce the marginal abatement cost curves describes a world that 
would develop on the basis of the economic fundamentals and technical constraints. Projecting long-
term energy profiles involves a large number of assumptions. World population is expected to increase 
from 6.5 billions today to 8.9 billions in 2050 with a marked decrease in average growth, which is due 
to the demographic transition and to stabilize in the second half of the century. The rate of economic 
growth in industrialized regions converges to under 2%/yr in the very long-run. Growth in Asian 
emerging economies falls significantly after 2010, while conversely it accelerates in Africa and the 
Middle East. As a result, global economic growth is expected progressively to slow from 3.5%/yr in the 
1990-2010 period to 2.9%/yr between 2010 and 2030 and then 2.2%/yr until 2050. Total world GDP in 
2050 is four times the present GDP. The US Geological Survey is the base source of information used 
for oil and gas Ultimate Recoverable Resources. It provides a set of estimates and attached 
probabilities that are consistent on a world and region-by-region basis. Technological developments 
regarding energy technology costs and performances are derived from a dedicated database 
TECHPOL
18, which allows maximizing the consistency of the exogenous hypotheses for the different 
time horizons and across the different technologies. 
                                                       




































































EU-25 -20  
Source: German Institute for Economic Research, 2007 
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